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Haiti:
Prospects for Stability

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SNIE 86.1-86
July 1986

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps



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HAITI: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

Information available as of 17 July 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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SCOPE NOTE

The fall of the Duvalier government in early 1986 has raised the prospect that Haiti can join the recent trend in Latin America in a movement from authoritarian regimes to democratically elected civilian governments. The absence of democratic institutions in Haiti, however, will make the transition there a difficult one. This Estimate will address the prospects for stability in Haiti over the next year or so and the chances for a successful transition to a democratically elected government.

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

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Since 7 February 1986, when the ruling National Council of Government (CNG) replaced ousted dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, the political situation in Haiti has remained unstable and economic conditions have worsened. 25X1

We believe there is a no better-than-even chance that the CNG will succeed in riding out the likely instability over the next 18 months. There is a lesser chance that it can deliver on its promise to hold elections on schedule:

— In its favor, Council President Namphy's announcement of a transition timetable, culminating in new national elections in November 1987, has helped to ease political tensions, at least temporarily.

— Furthermore, Namphy is personally popular, currently has strong support from the military, and has begun to demonstrate more visible leadership.

— Finally, the opposition is generally weak and divided and lacks a dominant political leader. Most democratic opposition elements believe there is currently no viable alternative to the CNG. 25X1

Nevertheless, severe problems remain:

— The CNG is faced with the competing interests of the urban masses who are demanding immediate socioeconomic improvements and of the Duvalierist power elite, which remains largely intact and intent on preserving its economic and political dominance. The result has been administrative and policy inertia.

— The CNG's failure to address successfully the country's socioeconomic problems has caused an erosion in popular support for the government and the armed forces. The CNG's legitimacy is now largely dependent on President Namphy's continued presence.

— Popular unrest, increasingly manipulated by extremists, has persisted and on several occasions has threatened the authority of the CNG. The armed forces probably would be unable

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effectively to control a serious breakdown in public order, although they can contain localized disturbances of limited duration.

— The Communist Party—benefiting from outside funding—is attempting to exploit the current instability both by covertly infiltrating grassroots groups as well as by overtly organizing and recruiting a core of militants. In both its overt and clandestine activities, the party has successfully grafted anti-American themes onto existing popular grievances. 25X1

As a result of these problems, we believe that it is equally likely that the CNG will be incapable of controlling future antigovernment protests, leading to a major breakdown in public order in the next year or so:

— In the event of such a breakdown, the most likely immediate outcome would be a bid for power, possibly through a coup attempt, by the old-guard Duvalierists, supported by at least some factions of the armed forces and members of the former militia (VSN).

— Such a government may be committed to restoring public order and the previous status quo, but it would likely face serious difficulties in obtaining significant domestic and foreign support. This could lead to yet another cycle of violence and bloodshed. 25X1

We believe the CNG's chances of staying in power and preventing a serious breakdown in public order for the next 18 months will depend in part on its willingness and ability to:

— Take decisive actions aimed at dismantling the Duvalierist power structure, without prompting an effort by the old-guard Duvalierists to oust the CNG.

— Provide tangible short-term economic benefits.

— Improve the capabilities of the security forces through reorganization, training, and additional personnel and equipment.

— Maintain the ambitious elections timetable to which it is now committed.

— Demonstrate clear leadership to the general populace. 25X1

We believe that even if the CNG does succeed in maintaining control and in implementing its current elections schedule, there will be significant opportunity for the Communist Party to capitalize on Haiti's

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economic problems and weak democratic forces to increase its influence, primarily through alliances with politically more acceptable but organizationally weaker democratic elements or through clandestine activities:

— The Haitian Communist Party apparently is receiving some financial and other covert support from a variety of sources, including the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the French and Dominican Communist Parties.

— Nevertheless, there is little possibility that the radical left will be able to take direct control of the government within the next year or so, either peacefully or through violence. The Communist Party is still small and in the formative stages of organization, and it lacks a firm basis of popular support.

— We believe the Communist Party might become a threat to the government after the elections, if the party establishes a firm support base. A Communist political base in Haiti, even if not in control of the government, would have wider regional implications, particularly in the neighboring Dominican Republic.

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We believe that developments in Haiti over the next year or so will have significant implications for US policy interests. These include:

— The need for increased foreign economic and security assistance to promote a successful democratic transition.

— A possible need for a US military operation to evacuate US citizens or a request for assistance to restore public order.

— The potential threat of an increased flow of illegal Haitian immigrants to the United States.

— The possibility that the Communist Party will establish a firm political base in Haiti over the longer term.

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DISCUSSION

Introduction and Background

1. The 29-year dictatorship of Haiti by the Duvalier family ended 7 February 1986 when President-for-Life Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) fled to France, and a military-civilian National Council of Government (CNG), headed by President and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Henri Namphy, assumed control. Duvalier's departure followed months of popular unrest, which arose spontaneously and reflected widespread dissatisfaction with his oppressive rule in a country with abysmal and inequitable economic conditions, with an estimated 50-percent unemployment, 80-percent illiteracy, and no functioning democratic institutions.

The Record of the National Council of Government

2. The original CNG, stressing that it was a transitional regime, immediately promised to hold legislative and presidential elections, but established no time frame. Press censorship was abolished and political prisoners released. The CNG also moved quickly to neutralize Duvalier's oppressive militia, the Volunteers for National Security (VSN), a force that vastly outnumbered the regular security forces and posed the greatest immediate threat to the new government.

3. The population, originally euphoric at its success in forcing Duvalier's ouster, soon began to express dissatisfaction with the composition of the CNG and with its failure to set a timetable for elections. Waves of protests swept the country as prodemocratic opposition forces as well as extremists on the left and right moved to exploit the public mood. The CNG suffered a setback in mid-March when human rights leader Gerard Gourgue—the only member of the CNG with no ties to the previous regime—resigned. Responding to growing public criticism, President Namphy reorganized the CNG, dropping the three members most closely identified with the Duvaliers.

4. On 26 April six people died when the police, provoked by rightist and leftist agitators, fired into a large crowd gathered at Fort Dimanche. Although the opposition at first tried to capitalize on the incident, after clear evidence of the role of agitators inciting the crowd and an effective appeal by President Namphy, the CNG emerged from the crisis with slightly enhanced political support.

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5. In early June, Haiti was wracked by a new wave of antigovernment unrest. Prompted originally by support for striking national television employees, demonstrators demanded the removal of CNG-member and Interior and Defense Minister Williams Regala and Finance Minister Delatour, the former because of his Duvalier past and the latter because of the unpopularity of his proposed economic reforms. The protests, characterized by significant levels of random violence, culminated in a call for a general strike on 10 June. In a preemptive move, the President adopted a firm stand against violence in a speech on 5 June and two days later announced a timetable for elections. Outlying areas did not respond to the strike call, and, although most businesses and schools in Port-au-Prince were closed 10 June, this was largely due to widespread fear of being caught up in violence.

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Current Situation

6. The CNG has weathered almost six months of crises and cyclical periods of unrest. President Namphy remains personally popular and there is general agreement among most democratic opposition elements—particularly in the wake of the Fort Dimanche incident—that there is currently no viable alternative to the CNG. Furthermore, the announcement of an election timetable appears to have helped ease political tensions, at least temporarily.

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7. Even its supporters, however, fault the CNG's inertia and failure to act except reactively. They cite the increasing nationwide lawlessness as evidence of the CNG's lack of effectiveness. Although General Namphy is committed to a democratic transition, he remains contemptuous of Haiti's politicians. During his first four months in power, Namphy argued against setting an elections timetable because he was convinced the people were not prepared. The CNG was unable to overcome the stalemate that developed over naming members of a consultative body, which was to oversee the first moves toward democracy. Now the

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Electoral Timetable

July 1986	Decree on political parties Decree on the press
September 1986	Decree for the formation of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of creating a liberal and democratic constitution. Decree convoking the people in local meetings to elect members of the Constituent Assembly.
October 1986	Election of members of the Constituent Assembly Proclamation of the results. Work of the Constituent Assembly and collective debates for the participation of the people in the creation of the constitution.
January 1987	Vote on the constitution by members of the Assembly.
February 1987	Referendum for the ratification of the constitution. Proclamation of the constitution.
March 1987	Decree on elections.
May 1987	Opening of the election campaigns for the rural areas and municipalities.
July 1987	Election of the administrative councils for the rural sections and the communal councils.
September 1987	Opening of the election campaign (legislative and presidential)
November 1987	Legislative and presidential elections.
December 1987	Official proclamation of the results.
January 1988	Validation of the powers of the legislative body.
7 February 1988	Taking of the oath of the elected president.

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government is committed to ambitious elections, which call for a constituent assembly election in October 1986 followed by legislative and presidential elections in November 1987.

8. The legacy of 29 years of Duvalier dictatorship is a political vacuum and a population with little understanding of and no experience in democracy. No major political leaders have emerged, and the incipient democratic political parties are weak and poorly organized. The apparently well-funded Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH) is attempting to fill the breach. Its leaders have returned from exile and are openly organizing and recruiting.

9. In the period since early February, a significant change in the attitude of the population in general has been evident, with its behavior becoming increasingly aggressive. The most obvious ramification of this change in outlook has been a dramatic increase in crime. Still heady with their success in ousting a dictator, the masses now have unrealistic expectations of the possibilities for change, and they represent a volatile factor that can easily be exploited. 25X1

10. Haiti's economic crisis has deepened since the CNG came to power. There has been a significant loss of jobs in the assembly sector, and tourism has dropped off sharply. Some foreign investors have reduced their operations or left because of labor unrest and the uncertain security situation. 25X1 25X1

11. There has recently been some increase in anti-American sentiment, which contrasts to the generally pro-American popular sentiment evident during the uprising against Duvalier. The United States is increasingly faulted for having supported the Duvalier regime, for failing to provide sufficient assistance to Haiti since the CNG came to power, and for attempting to impose its will on the country. 25X1 25X1

Major Political Actors

Security Forces

12. The current CNG is essentially a military government, despite the minimal participation of one

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civilian member. The Army enjoyed considerable popularity on 7 February when it first took power. This support has eroded over the past five months as a result of its failure to meet popular expectations, and support could quickly evaporate if during future unrest the security forces respond violently.

13. The US military attache in Haiti believes the military is united in its support of Namphy and the CNG. As a result of an early CNG decision to grant a military pay increase, the armed forces are the one group in Haiti who have not seen their economic situation deteriorate since the CNG came to power. However, some dissatisfaction and lack of unity within the ranks, and certain military reforms currently under consideration could cause further dissension.

14. There are various rival power factions within the high command, which restrict Namphy's freedom of action. For example, any move by Namphy to oust Regala would be opposed by significant elements in the security forces. The potential role of Lt. Col. Prosper Avril, Inspector General of the Presidential Guard and a key unofficial adviser to the CNG, remains difficult to predict. CNG plans to reorganize the Presidential Guard have already met with some resistance by Avril, who remains extremely unpopular with the general public because of his close association with the Duvaliers.

Duvalierists

15. While top-level Duvalier officials have been ousted by the government, organization structures and the bureaucracy of the regime remain intact. It is generally assumed that those Duvalierists who remain in the country continue to monitor political developments closely and are working to influence events and possibly destabilize the CNG. Their activity has been less evident since revelations of their involvement in inciting the Ft. Dimanche events and the detention of former Port-au-Prince mayor Franck Romain for his role.

16. The Duvalierists enjoy two advantages over most other political actors in Haiti: they have financial resources and they are knowledgeable about and experienced in Haitian politics. They can be expected to commit resources to efforts aimed at assuring the continued protection of their privileges and interests. This could include supporting certain parties and candidates or fomenting unrest to forestall a transition to a democratically elected government.

some Duvalierists are amassing arms for self-protection or to use for their own advantage.

17. It is assumed that there are contacts between the Duvalierists and former elements of the VSN, at least some of whom have retained their weapons. CNG member Regala is known to have close ties to Duvalierist elements, and many observers believe that he is responsible for the CNG's failure to act effectively to undermine Duvalierist interests. Former Interior Minister Lafontant, who hopes to return from exile to pursue the presidency, is reported to be in contact with remaining Duvalierist elements.

Non-Duvalierist Politicians

18. Baby Doc's ouster and the resulting opening of the political system produced an explosion of political groups and presidential candidates. No accurate count is possible, particularly before the political parties law has been decreed, but some observers claim there are currently more than 200 presidential candidates, most without any identifiable political affiliations, organizations, or even philosophy. Among the best-known and most serious candidates are those who offered token opposition during Baby Doc's tenure. These include Gregoire Eugene of the Social Christian Party of Haiti (PSCH), Sylvio Claude of the Christian Democratic Party of Haiti (PDCH), and Hubert de Ronceray. Former CNG member Gerard Gourgue is another candidate without a party.

19. Among returned exiles, former World Bank official Marc Bazin is respected among intellectual circles, but has been hurt by a widespread perception that he represents US interests. Aging former president Daniel Fignole, who was enthusiastically greeted on his return, could possibly command widespread support. Leslie Manigat of the National Progressive Democratic Assembly of Haiti has returned from exile in Venezuela.

20. One of the democratic opposition's main demands was met when the elections timetable was announced on 7 June. Many groups now appear to be waiting for the political parties law—scheduled to be decreed in July—to begin organizing their campaigns. All these groups are hampered by poor organization, limited funding, and no national following.

21. Opposition politicians, who have shown little interest in cooperating among themselves, are split in their attitude toward the CNG. Some, including de

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Ronceray, Bazin, and Eugene, support the CNG because they currently see no alternative. PDCH leader Sylvio Claude, however, has played a leading role in recent antigovernment demonstrations, insisting that Regala and Delatour must step down.

Business, Labor, and the Church

22. The Haitian business sector is composed largely of wealthy mulattoes, many of whom were supporters of the Duvalier regime. This group has so far tried to stay out of politics as much as possible, but they can be expected to provide funding to political candidates once election campaign activity gets under way. The business community's primary political goal is stability rather than democracy, however. In June, the Haitian Manufacturers Association (ADIH) publicly expressed its support for the CNG and denounced antigovernment disorders. Other business organizations refused to join in the ADIH statement.

23. The CNG is committed to allow free labor unions, and labor union activity—which existed only in token form under the previous regime—has increased dramatically since 7 February. Membership in the Haitian Federation of Union Workers (FOS) had increased 35 percent by early May, although FOS leader Joseph Senat was spending as much time promoting labor stability as organizing new unions. Work stoppages and strikes in all sectors of the Haitian economy and government have been a major challenge for the CNG since 7 February, an indication of the political potential of this sector. The leftist Autonomous Federation of Haitian Workers (CATH), which has demonstrated a considerable disruptive potential through its organization of antigovernment demonstrations, will probably play a growing role. there is still little concrete evidence of Communist infiltration of the labor movement

24. The Catholic Church in Haiti demonstrated its political influence during the weeks preceding Duvalier's ouster, although its role since has been less pivotal. The church hierarchy, including the influential Bishop Francois Gayot, has publicly supported the CNG and can be expected to continue to do so as long as the CNG remains committed to elections and refrains from human rights violations. Many parish priests, however, are opposed to the regime and are believed to be active in community organization efforts. While the stated goal of their activities is improved social and economic conditions, the political rhetoric associated with them is often leftist

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Community Groups

25. A pervasive phenomenon in the wake of Duvalier's downfall has been the organization of community groups and neighborhood committees. To a large extent this development was a spontaneous reaction of the population to their newfound liberty, particularly in light of the abolition of the feared militia, which under Duvalier had kept control at the neighborhood level. In some cases, the church played a role in developing community groups.

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26. The Committee for Democratic Unity (KID), has recently tried to coordinate activities of community groups, particularly in the Port-au-Prince area. Arguing that KID is not a political party, the organization's collective leadership, which includes journalist Evans Paul, claims its purpose is to represent the demands of the people. KID played a key role in the early June antigovernment disturbances.

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the KID, despite its denials, is a nondemocratic leftist group. Interior Minister Regala said the KID may be a "terrorist" organization and believes it is currently the most dangerous organization opposing the regime.

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The Radical Left

27. A number of radical leftist individuals and groups have emerged or returned from exile and are actively attempting to foment unrest. Very little is known of most of them, and their links to other groups or to each other are obscure. Some may be front organizations for the Communist Party (see insert).

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28. The most active of the parties of the radical left is the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH). Banned by Francois Duvalier in 1969, the party in exile probably numbered about 300 members. Most of the Central Committee have returned legally since Duvalier's ouster. Under the leadership of Secretary Gen. Rene Theodore, the PUCH is operating openly.

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The Haitian Left

Group: Unified Party of Haitian Communist (PUCH)
Leader: Rene Theodore
Comments:

Emerging as one of the more active and well-funded groups in Haiti, the PUCH received Cuban and Soviet financial assistance and close ties to the Dominican Communist Party. The Communists appear to have a two-track strategy of subversion and open political activity. says the party, based now in Haiti, has approximately 2,000 overt members, many recruited since Duvalier's overthrow, as well as some 200 clandestine veteran members. The party reportedly had only 300 members while in exile in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. The Communists reportedly hope to forge alliances with non-Communist elements and be elected to power, possibly in a coalition government.

Group: National Democratic and Progressive Party of Haiti (PNDPH)
Leader: Turnep Delpe
Comment:

says members of the PNDPH are returning from exile to engage in open political activity. Last year the US Embassy described this group as the most radical of Haiti's many exile organizations. Far left socialist in ideology, some of its members reportedly received paramilitary training in Libya. The group, which sometimes uses the name Popular Front for the Liberation of Haiti, plans to appeal to the lower classes by advocating a redistribution of land and wealth, Based in Miami and Caracas while in exile, the group probably had fewer than 50 members. Current membership is unknown.

Group: National Unified Liberation Front of Haiti (FULNH)
Leader: Raphael Bazin
Comment:

this group has been active clandestinely in Haiti since 1983 and was responsible for printing and distributing many of the anti-Duvalier pamphlets, which appeared last year. FULNH leader Bazin, who lived in exile in New York before returning to Haiti this year, was among those opposition leaders who called unsuccessfully for a general strike on 10 June. Membership unknown.

Group: Committee for Democratic Unity (KID)
Leader: Evans Paul, alias "Compere Plum"
Comment:

Also known as "Committee to Ignite Democracy." KID has led several antigovernment demonstrations in the capital. Leader Paul also implicated in agitation at Fort Dimanche in April. Press reports say group claims membership of journalists, students, and radical clerics. KID leaders planned agitation in June in Cap-Haitien to stir protests against ruling council member Regala. KID membership is unknown.

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Group: Haitian Workers Party (PTH)
Leader: Serge Gilles
Comment:

Pro-Chinese Marxist party. The PTH's front group is the Union of Patriotic and Democratic Forces (IFOPADA). reports Cuba invited both groups to send a representative to the Anti-Imperialist Conference in Managua in February. Gilles is a close confidante of former expatriate Marc Bazin when they were in exile, Formerly based in the Dominican Republic, the group's membership is unknown.

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Group: National Democratic Group of Haiti (RDNP)
Leader: Leslie Manigat
Comment:

According to Manigat, the RDNP is social democratic. however, that Manigat's deputy in the Dominican Republic was in contact with a probable front group of the pro-Cuban/pro-Libyan Socialist Bloc (BS) there. Manigat, long a resident of Caracas, returned to Haiti to run for president. Membership is unknown.

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Group: Dechoukage
Leader: Unknown
Comment:

several prominent members of this Gonaives-based vigilante group are leftist in orientation. Since February, members have hunted down and executed former militiamen and others associated with the Duvalier regime. Formal membership unknown, but there are probably several hundred people who take part in Dechoukage activities in Gonaives and other towns throughout Haiti.

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An overt recruitment drive has increased membership to an estimated 2,000, mostly students and intellectuals.

29. Theodore is not actively seeking the immediate demise of the ruling CNG, believing that time is on his side. The party's current emphasis is on overt activity, and there are plans to open PUCH offices throughout the country. Theodore has adopted a high profile and responsible public stance, concentrating on identifying the PUCH with popular themes, such as the need for jobs and the recovery of Duvalier's assets. He has gradually introduced anti-American themes into his rhetoric.

30. In addition to its overt activities, the party has covertly infiltrated various community organizations and has exploited protests by others. the PUCH has hired agitators and there are reports of links between the PUCH and the KID. are consistent with PUCH plans to foment popular movements and work to bring about a popularly elected government as well as to utilize youth groups as "agit-prop vanguards." The PUCH is currently eschewing identifiable cooperation with other radical leftists.

31. A major obstacle facing the PUCH, however, is the negative image that Communism has among the general population, which could compel the PUCH eventually to resort to a united front strategy. an electoral pact has been struck between the PUCH, Gerard Gourgue, and the KID. The party organization is still in the nascent stage, and it lacks a firm basis of support within the population.

32. The government lacks the capability to obtain complete information on PUCH activities but has attempted to infiltrate the organization. The CNG has not established an intelligence service to replace the Permanent Commission of Inquiry, which was disbanded toward the end of the Duvalier regime. There has been some discussion of the possibility of legally proscribing the Communists, but the CNG would have even more difficulty keeping track of the party's activities if it were forced to go underground. In light of Theodore's high profile and nonviolent campaign, such a move could create sympathy for him and prove counterproductive.

Foreign Support for the Radical Left

33. There is mounting evidence of varied foreign contacts and foreign funding and training for Haitian radical leftists. Among the sources are the Soviet Union, Libya, Cuba, and the Dominican and French Communist parties. The Communist Party, in particular, is apparently well funded, although firm evidence of all the sources and exact amounts of this funding is scarce. It is clear, however, that the PUCH is receiving relatively extensive foreign support. 25X1

34. By mid-February, the Cubans had sent $20,000 to the PUCH, reportedly the first of two installments. by mid-April, the party had received another $35,000, possibly from the USSR. believe the PUCH is also receiving funds from the French Communist Party. A Theodore intends to seek additional funds from the Soviet Union. He has reportedly already obtained 150 scholarships for Haitian students to study in the Soviet Union. 25X1

35. At the time of Duvalier's ouster, the Communist Party in the Dominican Republic (PCD) actively sought to spur the PUCH to exploit the unexpected opportunity in Haiti and offered financial and military support. Although the PCD offered to help infiltrate PUCH leaders into Haiti, Theodore preferred to wait to enter legally. The Dominican Communists also discussed the Haitian situation with the Cubans, who had been caught offguard by the sudden collapse of the Duvalier regime. The Dominicans reportedly suggested that Haitians living in Cuba could be infiltrated into Haiti to serve as the foundation of a future leftist movement there. 25X1

36. There have been isolated reports of contacts between Haitian leftists and Libya. The Fils-Aime brothers, members of the Haitian Liberation Movement, requested funds and arms from Libya but to date reportedly have received neither. The Filsaimes are also reportedly looking at the possibility of organizing a conference of all Haitian leftists to which observers from the Libyan-supported Caribbean Nation Movement would be invited. said that Sansaricq's Democratic Force for the Liberation of Haiti maintains contact with Libya and the Soviet Union, and that some members had received training in Libya. There are also reports of Haitian exiles in Venezuela going to Libya for training.

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Obstacles to the Transition

37. The CNG is committed to a timetable that is to culminate in national elections in November 1987 and the inauguration of a democratically elected president on 7 February 1988. The announcement of the timetable in early June has helped to ease popular unrest at least temporarily. President Namphy is also aided by the strong support he has within the Army. In addition, the opposition lacks unity or a strong popular leader and thus does not represent an immediate challenge to the CNG. Finally, Namphy has begun to demonstrate more visible leadership, as evidenced by his recent visits to several provincial capitals. Nevertheless, Namphy and the CNG must overcome a number of problems if they are to oversee a successful democratic transition, not the least of which is meeting their ambitious electoral timetable.

CNG Shortcomings

38. The major challenge facing the CNG is to manage the incompatibility between the unrealistic demands of the masses, who expected Duvalier's ouster to result in immediate socioeconomic progress, and the Duvalierist power structure, which remains largely intact and intent on preserving its economic and political dominance. The CNG, arguing that it is only a transitional government, has so far failed to propose any real political or economic program to attack the country's problems or promote its own image. Although President Namphy is still personally respected, the legitimacy of the CNG has eroded somewhat as time has passed and it has failed to establish effective administrative authority. Furthermore, should anything happen to Namphy, the CNG would lose most of its residual support.

39. The regime has been unable even to find capable and willing personnel to fill many administrative positions. Except at the very top levels, most government officials are holdovers from the Duvalier era who are continuing to follow previous practices. Regala, considered by some to be the real power in the CNG, is a frequent target of antigovernment protests because of his Duvalierist connections. The CNG is thus open to criticism that it represents "Duvalierism without Duvalier." A particularly critical problem has been finding and keeping qualified cabinet ministers. The current finance minister, a knowledgeable former World Bank official, has come under fire for proposed reforms that are economically advisable but politically unpopular. If he is forced out or leaves, the CNG would have difficulty finding a replacement

40. Namphy has been hesitant to actively seek popular support, and he generally disdains politics and politicians. This has allowed those—on the left and right—who seek the demise of the CNG to foment trouble and put the CNG on the defensive. Although the CNG has now weathered several crises, its own mistakes have contributed to its problems. There will probably be additional crises that may easily become unmanageable given the CNG's tenuous control.

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Popular Discontent

41. The success of the popular uprising against Duvalier gave many Haitians unrealistically high expectations of immediate economic and social improvements. Their frustration with the lack of progress—and actual decline—in the economy has led to frequent eruptions of labor unrest and antigovernment protests. This recent volatility of the masses is particularly evident among students and the working class.

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42. In a vicious cycle, the instability arising from frustrated economic expectations has served further to undermine the Haitian economy. Several foreign firms have pulled out of Haiti or reduced their operations as a result of the recent labor unrest and political uncertainty. The tourism industry—previously in crisis—has virtually ground to a halt. Although there has been a modest increase in foreign aid since early February, persistent unrest has significantly interfered with aid distribution.

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Extremist Agitation

43. Whereas the popular unrest that led to Duvalier's ouster was largely spontaneous, the frequent outbreaks of protest against the CNG have been exploited or even orchestrated by the extreme left and extreme right in efforts to destabilize the regime. Given the current restiveness and poverty of the population, any group can easily hire demonstrators and create disturbances

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both Duvalierist elements and the Communist Party have done this. The Unified Democratic Committee (KID) is also believed to have organized antigovernment protests. The politically inexperienced Haitian masses are particularly susceptible to such manipulation.

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Limited Capabilities of Security Forces

44. The militia (VSN), the most effective instrument of control and source of intelligence for the Duvalier regime, was disbanded by the CNG. Thus the only security forces at its disposal are the poorly

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Haiti: Socioeconomic Comparisons

Life Expectancy at Birth, 1982



Enrollment Rate, Secondary School, 1981



Gross National Product Per Capita, 1984



Infant Mortality Rate, 1982



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The Haitian Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armees d'Haiti—FAd'H) are capable of controlling short-term public disturbances but not prolonged, countrywide disruptions. They are not able to effectively monitor Haiti's coastal waters or its border with the Dominican Republic. The FAd'H is poorly trained and equipped and cannot sustain tactical operations for an extended period of time. The FAd'H is severely hampered by the lack of an intelligence organization, very limited troop transport, an unreliable communications system, and poor equipment maintenance.

Organized as a unitary military force incorporating ground units, a Navy, an Air Corps, and a constabulary element, the FAd'H has an authorized strength of 7,700. Approximately half of this force is distributed throughout the nine military departments, which follow departmental boundaries. The remaining troops are garrisoned in Port-au-Prince and comprise the only units considered to have a tactical capability. These include (with corresponding strengths) the Port-au-Prince Police (1,000), the Leopards Corps (360), the Dessalines Battalion (740), and the Presidential Guard (1,350). The latter unit controls the majority of armor and artillery equipment as well as ammunition stockpiles. The Navy, based and headquartered at Port-au-Prince, has a personnel strength of 250 and an inventory of 11 patrol boats. The Air Corps has 250 personnel and 46 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, based in Port-au-Prince.

Probably less than a third of the aircraft are operationally available at any given time. 25X1

Until the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier, each of the military departments was autonomous and, as with key tactical units, reported directly to the President-for-Life. This command structure prevented General Staff officers from exercising any real authority. Under the National Council of Government (CNG), President (Lt. General) Namphy has designated the Deputy Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Jean Belliote, as the Acting Chief of Staff with operational control over all FAd'H troops. Col. Williams Regala, Inspector General of the Armed Forces, has assumed the dual role of CNG member and Minister of Interior and National Defense. These changes reflect a move toward a traditional, operationally oriented chain of command. Other changes under consideration by Namphy are a redistribution of Presidential Guard assets to the military departments, an increase of FAd'H strength to 10,000, and the establishment of the constabulary forces as a separate police organization under civilian control. 25X1

Haiti is not a producer of military equipment and depends on foreign sources to equip its security forces. The United States has been the principal supplier of equipment and training. Current plans to upgrade the FAd'H include training in vehicle maintenance, riot control procedures, helicopter operations, and police functions. Training and equipment is to be provided by the United States, Canada, and France. 25X1

trained and poorly equipped Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H), which number only 7,700 at full complement, a vastly insufficient number to serve security and police functions for a country of 6 million. The security forces would not be capable of responding to widespread unrest or to a major breakdown in security. Although the armed forces are currently united in their support of the CNG, a further deterioration in the security situation could engender divisions and erode this support.

45. Throughout the disturbances that preceeded Duvalier's downfall, the armed forces retained popular support. This support has now diminished somewhat and there were several instances of direct attacks against security forces during the disturbances in early June. If future unrest leads to violent confrontations between protesters and security forces, this support would deteriorate further (see insert).

Weakness of Democratic Elements

46. Haiti lacks any tradition of democratic political institutions, so there is little firm basis for the emergence of a coherent party system. No single dominant leader has emerged from the large field of potential presidential candidates. The failure of the democratic opposition leaders to take advantage of their freedom to organize and work constructively toward a stable democratic transition has reinforced President Namphy's inherently negative view of politicians and has permitted the Communist Party to occupy terrain by default. 25X1

47. Most in the democratic opposition lack training, funding, and any sense of cooperating among themselves. The strong sense of self-interest characteristic of many of the potential presidential candidates could facilitate an effort by the radical left to increase its role by providing organizational and financial support for a democratic "front" candidate. There are reports, for example, that Marc Bazin is being urged by the French Government to cooperate with alleged Communist Serge Gilles, and that Gerard Gourgue has received funds from the Communist Party. 25X1 25X1

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Key Variables

De-Duvalierization

48. To maintain the support of a population increasingly frustrated by the lack of anticipated economic and social improvements since 7 February, the CNG must seize the initiative. The two crucial popular demands are for meaningful "de-Duvalierization" and for new jobs to relieve the pressure of growing unemployment.

49. If Namphy is to deflect demands for the ouster of key members of the government (for example, Regala) he must make progress in other aspects of de-Duvalierization, such as the recovery of Duvalier's assets and the prosecution of former senior officials. If the CNG succeeds in its request for the extradition from Brazil of former Port-au-Prince police chief Albert Pierre, his trial could provide a concrete demonstration of the regime's commitment to make a break with the past.

Economic Improvements

50. Haiti's economic situation is increasingly becoming a key issue, and the CNG's ability to maintain control will depend on its success in responding to the admittedly inflated popular expectations for improved economic conditions. Economic grant aid is required to meet immediate import needs and avoid the downside risks of a collapse of the economy. Realistically it is difficult to anticipate much, if any, real economic growth in the period of the Estimate. Foreign aid and investment are the keys to improvement, but there is little likelihood that sufficient outside investment will be forthcoming, particularly given the continuing unrest (see inset).

51. The Haitian economy requires major reform, and Finance Minister Delatour has pleased IMF officials with his willingness to attempt long-term structural changes. He also is taking potentially unpopular austerity measures, such as closing inefficient state monopolies and liberalizing interest rates. The CNG would probably achieve greatest political impact by using increased economic aid to provide jobs for the working class and students. The arrival of substantial amounts of foreign emergency assistance over the past few months has helped to meet the basic food needs of the poorer elements of society.

Enhanced Security Capability

52. The CNG's ability to contain inevitable future unrest will be a key factor for its survival through the transition process. Shortcomings of the security forces, which require major reorganization as well as additional personnel, training, and equipment, are a major limiting factor. While increased foreign security assistance could address some of these needs, there is little likelihood of sufficient improvement during the period of the Estimate to assure the CNG's capacity to maintain domestic stability. France has agreed to provide $1.2 million to develop a gendarmerie from the existing police element of the armed forces, but this process is expected to take several years.

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Outlook

Muddling Through

53. There is no better-than-even chance that the CNG will succeed in riding out the likely instability of the next 18 months, preventing any of the inevitable crises from getting out of control. There is a lesser chance that it can deliver on its promise to hold elections on schedule. Given the current state of flux among democratic elements and the failure of any real frontrunners to emerge so far, it is impossible to predict with any certainty the candidates or coalitions that are likely to emerge as frontrunners in the elections. Nevertheless, it is almost certain that there will be a leading candidate generously supported by old-guard Duvalierists.

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54. It is also likely that the Communist Party will participate in the democratic process in the event the CNG survives and holds elections. Given the limits of Haitian popular acceptance of Communism—when identified as such—the radical left is likely to seek alliances with ostensibly democratic opposition leaders. The radical left, with its external funding and good organizational skills, will probably be able to capitalize on Haiti's dire poverty and weak democratic elements to increase its influence during and after an election campaign:

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— The Communist Party seems prepared to implement a long-term strategy, believing that, given the inevitability of continued frustration and unrealized expectations among the Haitian population, time favors revolutionary forces. Thus, in the event the CNG does muddle through the next 18 months, we believe Haiti's democratic prospects might be most seriously threatened only after the elections.

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Fall of the CNG

55. It is equally likely that the CNG will be incapable of controlling future antigovernment protests lead-

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Haiti: Economic Barriers to Stability

Economic activity, stagnating since 1980, has continued to decline in the post-Duvalier period, frustrating widespread popular expectations for an immediate improvement in living standards. Although long-term prospects for economic growth are reasonably bright, no rapid turnaround is possible, and any significant improvement in living standards over the next 18 months will depend on a large increase in foreign aid. Although donors have indicated a willingness to boost aid levels in the wake of Namphy's announcement of an election timetable, the pace and amount of aid receipts are likely to fall short of the level needed to prevent further sporadic outbreaks of violence.

IMF officials believe real economic activity will decline about 2 percent this year as a result of lower imports, reduced government spending, faltering business confidence, labor difficulties, and a falloff in tourism. Output in the key light assembly sector has been hit by a 10-percent decline in imported inputs, the withdrawal of some foreign investment, and strikes in all sectors of the economy that have interrupted commerce. Tourism, already debilitated by the country's association with the AIDS disease, suffered further losses as a result of the popular disturbances during the peak winter tourist season. Reduced government spending, particularly on subsidies to state-owned sugar, oil, and wheat refineries, are further eroding economic output.

Despite these problems, the government's efforts to stabilize the economy and encourage growth hold out prospects for long-term improvement, in the opinion of multilateral and bilateral donors and commercial bankers. The ruling council is moving to revitalize business confidence and in late June established two commissions to facilitate new investment and to handle labor disputes. The government has begun to liberalize foreign trade by slashing import license requirements, a move that will effectively abolish some existing monopolies and reduce consumer prices on key imported items. In addition, Port-au-Prince plans to cut tariffs in keeping with World Bank advice.

As a result of the government's willingness to adopt needed economic reforms, prospects are good for the implementation by early fall of a $21 million, three-year IMF Structural Adjustment Facility, according to IMF officials. Such an agreement would greatly encourage foreign and domestic lending and investment. An accord will depend on Finance Minister Delatour's ability to continue to adhere to unpopular economic austerity measures despite pressure for his resignation, and the IMF is urging Haiti to pay past obligations.

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The government also is seeking foreign aid from other sources, and potential donors, initially skeptical of the government's commitment to a transition to democracy, have begun to promise new assistance, according to reliable sources:

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- French aid to Haiti will reach $20 million this year and will double next year.
- Japan will provide $20 million in rural development and food aid.
- The EC will fund $10 million of road and agricultural projects.
- Canada will supply food aid and is considering balance-of-payments assistance.

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- West Germany will back rural electrification and low cost housing projects but cannot supply balance-of-payments or commodities aid.
- Italy is considering sending assistance.

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These promises nonetheless fall short of the $125 million in new foreign aid—in addition to the $150 million already committed by various donors before Duvalier's fall—that we calculate would be needed to raise GDP to the peak 1980 level in the next year or so. As a result, there is a substantial risk that economic discontent could act as a catalyst for further unrest.

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ing to a major breakdown in public order. If this happens, there is a good chance that old-guard Duvalierist elements would make a bid for power. This could take the form of a military government or of a civilian leader backed by at least some factions of the military as well as members of the former militia (VSN). Such a government may be committed to restoring order and the previous status quo, but it would probably face serious difficulties obtaining significant domestic and foreign support. This could lead to yet another cycle of violence and bloodshed.

Implications for the United States

56. The alternative scenarios for Haiti over the next one to two years all have serious implications for US policy interests. If the CNG is to increase its chances of staying in power for the next 18 months, it will require additional foreign economic aid and security assistance from the United States and others. If the CNG loses control and Haiti is consumed by widespread violence, foreign intervention—by the United States or by a multinational force—may be requested to restore order. The Dominican Republic would feel particularly

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threatened by a breakdown in public order next door and would expect the United States to act to prevent a spillover. In any event, the United States may be required to take unilateral action to evacuate US citizens in Haiti.

57. The likelihood of an increased role for the radical left in Haiti has obvious implications for the United States. The Communist Party has already been moderately successful at providing anti-American explanations for Haiti's continuing problems resulting in some change in popular sentiment toward the United States in recent months. Throughout the period of unrest that led to Duvalier's downfall, public opinion in Haiti remained staunchly pro-American, but a strong element of anti-Americanism is now evident and is likely to intensify if the political and economic crises continue. Finally, in the event that the Communist Party is able to establish a firm political base in Haiti, this could have wider regional implications over the long term, particularly in the neighboring Dominican Republic.

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58. Increased public disorder would probably lead to a substantial increase in emigration from Haiti. Another threat lies in the possibility that the CNG or a successor government might refuse to cooperate with the United States on the current migrant accord under which the number of illegal Haitian immigrants known to have entered the United States fell from 15,000 in 1981 to 95 in 1985. An abrogation of the accord would result in an immediate and dramatic increase in the number of Haitian immigrants attempting to reach the United States.

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Annex A

Lt. Gen. Henri NAMPHY

1. Haiti's highest ranking military officer, Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy became president of the ruling National Council of Government (CNG) in February 1986 after public pressure forced President Jean-Claude Duvalier into exile. Although Namphy has a reputation as a competent army commander, he is a political novice who has been slow to act and indecisive. Namphy appears to back off from making political, economic, and social changes but more than likely is overwhelmed by executive responsibility. He seems to be making progress in developing self-confidence and decisionmaking ability, however, and we believe that, for the near term at least, Namphy will dominate and control the CNG and steer Haiti steadily toward democracy.

2. Although widely popular and respected by military, church, and business leaders, Namphy has repeatedly asserted that he has no political ambitions, and that he is serving his country at a time when strong leadership is needed. He is determined not to bow to public demands for changes if he feels they are unjustified.

3. As a career military officer, Namphy, first and foremost, is loyal to the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H). He has increased military salaries and has ordered a restructuring of the FAd'H to improve its professionalism and effectiveness in countering the growing leftist threat. He distrusts the better known civilian politicians and sees no current role for them.

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4. Namphy is committed to bringing democracy to politically bereft Haiti but recognizes the difficulty involved in achieving that goal. He therefore wants to use the transition period to build a solid foundation of employment and education. His goal also is to teach Haitians respect for human and civil rights and to educate them about their responsibilities in a democracy.

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5. Responding to domestic and international pressure, Namphy has scheduled national elections for November 1987 and the presidential inauguration for February 1988. He still faces widespread dissatisfaction, however, over the pace and scope of economic reforms. Namphy, who is uncomfortable speaking in public, also has failed to keep Haitians informed of his actions and to keep the international community aware of Haiti's needs. He is attempting to overcome this handicap, for example, by traveling to the provinces and meeting with foreign journalists.

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7. A graduate of the Haitian military academy, Namphy rose steadily through the ranks under both Duvaliers, and in 1984 became Chief of Staff of the FAd'H—a position he technically still holds. Unlike most men of power and position in Haiti, Namphy is known for his honesty and maintains a modest lifestyle. He has been married at least twice and is currently separated; he has two daughters from his first marriage. Namphy, 53, speaks fluent Spanish and limited English.

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